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Foreword
There has been much discussion this week around public investment in high-growth start-ups.
The key challenge now is how to structure this type of investment and make sure it gets into the 
system effectively. Above all, public finance at this stage must lever private capital towards start-up 
businesses – otherwise it will be a wasted exercise.
NESTA’s  position as the UK’s largest portfolio investor in pre-revenue companies, alongside our 
research expertise, means we are uniquely placed to gain an insight into this area. This report 
considers the most effective models of public finance supporting growth businesses.
Execution and implementation are all, and are what the market will be looking to. 
Jonathan Kestenbaum 
CEO, NESTA
June, 2009
NESTA is the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts.
Our aim is to transform the UK’s capacity for innovation. We invest in  
early-stage companies, inform innovation policy and encourage a culture 
that helps innovation to flourish.
Executive summary
High-growth, entrepreneurial businesses 
are essential to the UK’s emergence from 
recession. But their success is dependent on 
several factors, one of which is the availability 
of appropriate finance. The availability of 
growth finance has declined drastically in the 
credit crunch, and too little has been done 
to revive it. It will be impossible to transform 
and rehabilitate the UK’s economy without an 
equivalent change in our sources of capital.
This shortage will not resolve itself. If left 
unchecked, it will undermine the innovative 
sectors on which the long-term growth of the 
UK’s economy depends. Government has an 
important role to play. Although there have 
been a large number of failed attempts by 
governments to stimulate the financing of 
high-growth businesses, there have also been 
notable success stories. 
By drawing out the principles of these 
examples, this paper sets out a proposal that 
offers a timely, efficient and smart way for 
the Government to support and stimulate 
investment in high-growth companies.
The challenge for the UK is not to create 
new high-growth start-ups, but how to 
support the continued growth of these 
businesses. Doing so could provide a 
valuable economic stimulus.
High-growth, innovative companies offer a 
potent answer to the economic challenges the 
UK faces. 
They generate a disproportionately large 
share of net new jobs.1 Research suggests 
that between 2 to 4 per cent of all firms are 
responsible for the majority of employment 
growth. Their combination of high productivity 
and employment growth means that high-
growth firms are also responsible for a 
substantial proportion of economic growth.2
Innovative businesses will only thrive where 
the right financial architecture is in place
These high-growth firms require significant 
capital up-front. And this is difficult to obtain 
through conventional sources of debt finance. 
These firms tend to have intangible assets 
and ambitious growth plans that require large 
amounts of finance, show a significant delay 
before generating revenue and consequently 
entail high risk. As a result, savings are 
inadequate and debt finance is inappropriate 
but venture capital is an alternative form of 
finance that is structured to address these 
challenges.3 
Venture-backed businesses are 
disproportionately important for growth
There are between 800 and 1,100 venture 
capital-backed businesses in the UK. Their 
high growth potential makes them vital to our 
economic future. Over the five-year period to 
2006/7, venture firms increased worldwide 
employment by 8 per cent a year compared 
with the 3 per cent growth achieved by FTSE 
Mid-250 companies. Their UK employment 
grew by 6 per cent, compared to a national rise 
of 1 per cent a year.4
Early-stage finance has been neglected and 
is suffering
The credit crunch has hit the venture capital 
sector hard. Most UK investors in early-stage 
technology companies have already invested 
most of their funds and are keeping most 
of what’s left for the follow-on investments 
in those firms. And very little new money 
is coming into the market, since the rate at 
which new venture funds are raised has slowed 
dramatically. In 2008, VC fundraising was down 
70 per cent on the previous year; 2009 looks 
set to be even worse. 
What should the Government do?
The case for government support for venture 
finance is greater now than ever: private capital 
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5is hard to come by and the future of this vital 
cohort of 1,000 growth firms is threatened.
Although there is a clear shortage of 
finance for high-growth companies in the 
coming years, and a gap that public support 
could fill, the Government should proceed 
with caution
Many past interventions have fallen foul of a 
few common problems: trying to achieve too 
many goals; being sub-scale; limiting the pool 
of potential investments, being too generous 
with public money. They have also suffered 
from unrealistic time horizons. Avoiding these 
pitfalls is a prerequisite for any credible policy 
in this area.
The role of government is not to make 
smart investments, but to make sure smart 
investments get made.
Six decades after the first government 
efforts to support finance to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, there is still 
no consensus as to what constitutes an 
effective model of government intervention
The report seeks to provide some light into this 
issue by addressing the following questions:
1. What should the Government do to 
promote finance to high-growth companies 
and what choices does it face in supporting 
early-stage investments? 
2. How can the Government create the 
conditions for investments in high-growth 
entrepreneurial firms? 
3. How much money is currently needed in 
the early-stage market? What form should 
any investment take? Should government 
invest directly or indirectly? Should any 
third-party investment be in existing or 
new funds? How should private capital be 
leveraged?
We address these questions in turn, 
highlighting the main issues and providing 
recommendations, along with international 
case studies of attempts to stimulate the 
venture market. 
Finally, we propose the establishment of a 
public-private fund of funds, making use 
of the best of private sector experience and 
avoiding many of the pitfalls of excessive direct 
intervention. The proposal could be put into 
action with an investment of £150 million of 
public money, and would begin stimulating 
growth businesses within a matter of weeks. 
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Part 1: Overview
This report addresses the question of how to 
encourage and support growth businesses to 
lead the UK out of recession. In particular, it 
focuses on the financial architecture necessary 
to support growth, and demonstrates the 
importance of a functioning early-stage finance 
sector to the real economy. Although there 
have been many misadventures in government 
attempts to finance early-stage businesses, 
global experience suggests that public support 
has an indispensable role to play, and that it is 
possible to provide this support in a way that is 
limited, timely and effective.
We believe that:
a. it is impossible to achieve a transformation 
of the UK economy without an equivalent 
change in our sources of capital;
b. there is a vital but limited role 
for government in enabling this 
transformation.
High-growth, innovative companies offer a 
potent answer to our economic challenges. But 
such firms have often had difficulty obtaining 
finance, and these difficulties have increased 
considerably in the recession. The Government 
is now considering whether and how to 
stimulate investment in these businesses.
There are positive examples from around the 
world of how government can encourage early-
stage investment, leveraging private capital 
and helping high-growth firms grow faster. But 
there are also many examples of failure. The 
final section of the report sets out principles 
for how the Government can effectively 
support the financial underpinnings of a high-
growth economy, concluding with a specific 
proposal that incorporates UK and international 
lessons with NESTA’s own practical experience 
of venture capital investing.
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Part 2: The importance of growth businesses
Innovative, fast-growing companies are a 
vital source of long-term economic growth 
and job creation.5 They are also central to the 
vision of new industries set out in the White 
Paper New Industry, New Jobs. The UK will 
continue to be an economy driven by the 
creation and exploitation of knowledge. Over 
the last 15 years the contribution of high-
technology manufacturing and knowledge-
intensive services to UK gross value added has 
increased steadily to over 40 per cent.6 The 
nature of these sectors is likely to change as 
global demand changes, and many of the big 
prizes will be won by new firms rather than 
incumbents.
High-growth firms are relatively rare in the UK 
economy. In 2005, there were 11,369 high-
growth firms in the UK, representing 6.3 per 
cent of all firms employing ten employees or 
more.7 However, the impact of high-growth 
firms in the UK economy is very significant. 
New evidence8 suggests that high-growth firms 
in the period 2002-2005 created more than 
twice the number of jobs than slower-growing 
businesses.9 The UK share of high-growth 
firms in 2005 is higher than in the United 
States – 6.3 compared to 5.2 per cent. Indeed, 
it has the highest share of all other developed 
industrial economies for which data is available. 
But only a minority of firms in the UK manage 
to sustain high levels of growth for more than 
a short period of time. The biggest challenge 
for the UK is not the supply of promising firms, 
but how to help them succeed.
A number of factors are important to the 
growth of innovative firms:
•	Access to knowledge. Proprietary 
knowledge (whether of new technologies, 
business processes, or other know-how) is 
frequently a basis for rapid growth. Effective 
research universities with competent 
technology transfer offices are frequently 
identified as important sources of this 
knowledge. Just as important is the ability to 
generate breakthrough knowledge through 
interdisciplinary academic collaboration, 
or by effective models of open innovation 
among firms and between firms and 
universities.
•	Skilled workforces. The skills agenda 
as highlighted in the Leitch Review10 is 
vital to the ability to build high-growth 
businesses. Growing firms, especially in 
high-tech sectors, are prodigious consumers 
of talent. But technical skill alone is not 
enough. The mindset of the entrepreneur 
is equally important: the UK’s ability to 
nurture entrepreneurs who think across 
traditional disciplines and industries is vital 
for innovation.
•	Effective infrastructure. Effective 
infrastructure for innovation is in some cases 
physical; superfast broadband supporting 
digital media, or proximity to Stansted 
airport helping Cambridge-based stem cell 
companies fly their bespoke products to 
distant hospitals. But more importantly, 
innovation is also driven by the networks 
and relationships that bind companies 
together. Take the role of effective supply 
chains. Toyota’s supply chain is structured 
in such a way that suppliers have strong 
incentives to innovate (they are offered 
a share in the savings); GM’s traditionally 
wasn’t, and is suffering the consequences. 
Effective linkages between businesses and 
organisations (such as universities, basic 
research laboratories, applied research 
laboratories, technology transfer agencies, 
9
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The definition of ‘high-
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increased revenues 20 per 
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past three years.
8. Ibid.
9. In fact, in 2005-08 the gap 
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created almost a quarter of a 
million more jobs.
10. HM Treasury (2005) ‘Leitch 
Review of skills in the UK: 
The long-term challenge.’ 
London: HMT.
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governance organisations, banks and venture 
capitalists) are an important contributor to 
innovative capability.11 
•	Demand for innovation. Companies are 
more likely to innovate successfully if they 
can count on deep markets for new products. 
This is partly a question of simple market 
size: better access to local and international 
customers through strong supply chains and 
foreign trade helps. But even more important 
is the extent to which customers demand 
innovative products. The importance of 
American consumers’ hunger for new goods 
and services has been cited as an important 
factor for the US’s economic growth.12
•	Availability and access to finance. Many 
of the most innovative firms have long 
start-up phases. During this time, firms 
incur development costs but little revenue. 
They also lack significant assets that could 
be used as collateral for loans.13 This is 
particularly true of high-tech businesses, 
which have offered some of the best growth 
opportunities over the past 30 years. This 
makes the question of finance central to 
these firms’ ability to get started and to 
thrive.
The financial element is particularly crucial, 
and it is on this factor that we will focus in this 
report. Public policy has dedicated significant 
energy to opening regional and global markets 
for trade, attempting to fill skills gaps, 
promoting academic science and technology, 
and developing infrastructure. The provision of 
finance for high-growth start-ups is a tougher 
challenge. As the White Paper, New Industry, 
New Jobs, states: “For this reason, access to 
finance is an important barrier for business to 
develop their full potential and the government 
clearly states that any constraint on the ability 
of UK-based businesses to exercise comparative 
advantage on the basis of high levels of skills 
or knowledge must be regarded as a serious 
impediment to the UK’s economic success”.14 
11. Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. 
(1998) ‘The Associational 
Economy: Firms, Regions, 
and Innovation.’ Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
12. Bhide, A. (2008) ‘The 
Venturesome Economy.’ 
Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
13. Oakey, R. (1984) Innovation 
and regional growth in 
small high technology firms: 
evidence from Britain and 
the USA. ‘Regional Studies.’ 
18, pp.237-251.
14. HM Government (2009) 
‘New Industry, New Jobs.’ 
White Paper. London: TSO. 
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Part 3: Small but mighty: the place of venture capital in 
the UK’s financial architecture
To understand how the UK’s financial system 
needs to change to support innovation and 
growth, we need to consider the UK’s financial 
architecture as a whole.
There are three main sources of finance 
available to business: 
•	Debt finance – most commonly the provision 
of a loan of some form that is subsequently 
repaid at a pre-agreed interest rate. These 
may be available from a High Street Bank 
or specialist finance providers. There are 
many sources of debt finance: the corporate 
bond market for the largest firms; bank 
financing facilities; small business loans; and 
small-scale entrepreneurs financing their 
businesses through remortgaging or credit 
card debt.
•	Equity finance – whereby capital is provided 
to the company in return for a shareholding 
in the business by corporate investors, 
business angels, venture capital/private 
equity or public sector schemes. There are 
a wide range of services provided by the 
public markets, accessible through flotations 
or other share issues by the largest firms, 
through private equity, leveraged buy-outs, 
management buy-outs and buy-ins.
•	‘Soft capital’ – typically associated with 
grant funding or financial subsidies provided 
from the public sector through grants, R&D 
tax incentives, innovation vouchers or other 
means. Such financial support is typically 
available through Regional Development 
Agencies, government departments and 
devolved administration departments in 
Scotland and Wales. 
New high-growth firms need different kinds 
of support depending on their stage of 
development. They thrive if there is a smooth 
progression from one type of funding to 
the next.15 Figure 1 (page 10) illustrates 
the journey of company growth from idea 
generation to profitability. Different sources of 
capital are relevant at different stages of the 
firm’s development. The former Department 
for Innovation, Universities and Skills described 
this as an “escalator of financial support for 
innovative businesses at different stages of 
their growth”.16
The red boxes in Figure 1 represent those 
steps where finance is hardest to obtain. They 
need particular attention from policymakers. 
Most investors and entrepreneurs observe 
that an ‘equity gap’ exists for investments 
from £250,000 to £2 million; others have 
identified a second equity gap that stretches 
up to £5 million (especially for the medical and 
pharmaceutical sector).
3.1 High-growth businesses have 
limited access to debt 
At first glance, finance for growth businesses 
appears to present only a limited problem. A 
recent European Commission report17 showed 
that only 19 per cent of UK small and medium-
sized enterprises saw limited access to finance 
as a constraint. Although this figure was higher 
than that in other European countries (it was 
just 7 per cent and 9 per cent respectively in 
Finland and Denmark), it at least implied that 
the vast majority of the UK firms are able to 
secure external finance.
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Figure 1: Business finance architecture
Figure 2: External sources of finance – percentage of business using various financial products
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However, this figure conceals a difference 
between different types of firm. As Figure 2 
shows, the majority of firms accessing finance 
relied on small-scale debt finance: credit cards, 
overdrafts and commercial loans. 
The high-growth firms described in Section 2 
often do not fit into this category, especially 
in their early years. These companies require 
significant capital up-front. And this is very 
hard to obtain from conventional sources of 
debt finance. They tend to have intangible 
assets, and show a significant delay before 
generating revenue making than a high risk 
investment.  
These firms are, of course, some of the most 
attractive growth prospects, and include start-
ups in the information technology, life sciences 
and advanced engineering sectors. They rely on 
early-stage equity finance: venture capital and 
angel investment.
Only a small proportion of businesses seek 
or receive venture capital finance.19 But if 
we are concerned about the foundation of 
new industries and the delivery of dramatic, 
transformative growth, we should focus on 
these particular companies.
Creating new industries also requires sustained 
investment over the long-term, continued 
commitment and long-term resources. The 
semiconductor and microcomputer industries 
are good examples of this lengthy and 
capital-intensive process.20 In both cases, it 
took up to ten years of continued risk capital 
investing before the industries properly took 
off. Virtually every other new industry since 
– biotechnology, personal computers, PC 
software, wireless communications, the Internet 
– have followed this pattern.21
3.2 The vital one thousand
Different estimates put the number of 
businesses in the UK that are reliant on venture 
capital at between 880 and 1,100.22 These firms 
play an important role in economic growth and 
job creation.
The largest recent survey showed that over the 
five years to 2006/7, firms backed by venture 
capital increased their worldwide employment 
by 8 per cent per year, a much higher rate 
of growth than the 3 per cent reported by 
most mid-sized companies. Venture-backed 
firms’ UK employment also grew by 6 per 
cent, compared to a national annual rise in 
employment of 1 per cent.23 
The evidence from the US, where venture 
activity has a longer pedigree, is even more 
compelling. The largest study showed that 
American companies that received venture 
capital from 1970-2006 accounted for 10.4 
million jobs and $2.3 trillion in revenues in 
2006.24 The total revenue of venture capital-
13
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innovation programme.’ 
Final Report. Brussels: EC; 
and CBR (2008) ‘Financing 
UK Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises: the 
2007 Survey.’ Cambridge: 
CBR. 
20. Bygrave, W. and Timmons, 
J. (1992) ‘Venture Capital at 
the Crossroads.’ Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business 
School Press.
21. Timmons, J. and Spinelli, 
S. (2003) ‘New Venture 
Creation: Entrepreneurship 
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York: McGraw-Hill.
22. Dow Jones as per January 
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Figure 3: Semiconductor Industry: Cumulative Number of Venture Capital Investments and 
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financed companies comprised 17.6 per cent 
of the nation’s GDP and 9.1 per cent of US 
private sector employment in 2006. Venture 
capital-backed companies outperformed 
their non-ventured counterparts in job 
creation and revenue growth. Employment 
in venture-backed companies jumped by 3.6 
per cent between 2003 and 2006 as national 
employment grew by just 1.4 per cent. At the 
same time, venture capital-backed company 
sales grew by more than 11.8 per cent, 
compared to an overall rise in US company 
sales of 6.5 per cent during the same period.
High-growth firms that rely on venture 
capital also have an important impact on 
innovation. A variety of studies have shown 
that venture-backed firms are responsible for 
a disproportionate number of patents and 
new technologies, and bring more radical 
innovations to market faster than lower-growth 
businesses that rely on other types of finance.27 
This is partly because high-growth firms are 
more likely to rely on venture funding because 
of their unique financial needs, and partly 
because venture capitalists use their influence 
as shareholders and business networks to 
encourage rapid growth and professional 
management. 
3.3 New industries and venture capital
High-growth, venture-backed firms are also 
more likely to generate new industries.28 
Examples include personal computers, cellular 
communications, microcomputer software, 
biotechnology, and overnight delivery.29 In 
the words of one US survey, their effects 
have included “the creation of hundreds of 
thousands of new jobs, new expenditures for 
research and development, increased export 
sales, and the payment of hundreds of millions 
of dollars in state taxes. By mobilizing and later 
recycling scarce risk capital and entrepreneurial 
talent, venture capital firms have transformed 
the economy”.30 
Some venture capital-backed companies create 
products so revolutionary that they gave 
birth to new industries; others bring about 
evolutionary change in existing industries.31 
Venture capital has played an important role 
in the development of some of the most 
significant scientific inventions and important 
industries of our times. It is one of the crucial 
ingredients in the mix of scientific discovery, 
entrepreneurial talent and finance that drives 
new industries, and has sometimes created 
ideas and inventions powerful enough to 
transform society.
26. Ibid.
27. Kortum, S. and Lerner, 
J. (2000) Assessing the 
contribution of venture 
capital to innovation. ‘RAND 
Journal of Economics.’ Vol. 
31, No. 4, Winter 2000, 
pp.674–692; Hellman, 
T. and Puri, M. (2002) 
Venture capital and the 
professionalisation of start-
ups: Empirical Evidence. 
‘Journal of Finance.’ 57, 
pp.169-197; Kaplan, S. 
and Stromberg, P. (2001) 
Financial contracting meets 
the real world: an empirical 
analysis of venture capital 
contracts. ‘Review of 
Economic Studies.’ 2002, 
pp.1-35.
28. See Ibid; and Timmons, 
J. and Spinelli, S. (2003) 
‘New Venture Creation: 
Entrepreneurship for the 
21st Century.’ New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
29. Bygrave, W. and Timmons, 
J. (1992) ‘Venture Capital at 
the Crossroads.’ Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business 
School Press.
30. Ibid. p.2.
31. Ibid.
Figure 4: Minicomputer Industry: Cumulative Number of Start-up Companies and Industry 
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Part 4: The role for government in early-stage investment 
If the story were as simple as this, the message 
for policymakers would be clear: stand back 
and give venture capital funds free rein to 
invest, delivering profit for themselves and 
growth and innovation for the rest of the 
economy. However, the situation is more 
complex.
As Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School 
remarked: “It is instructive to observe that all 
venture capital markets of which we are aware 
were initiated with some form of government 
support. These markets do not appear to 
emerge without some form of assistance.”32 
This section will outline the role of public 
money in the UK early-stage finance market, 
and how the credit crunch has exacerbated the 
market failures that public intervention sets out 
to address.
4.1 The role of government 
The existence of an equity gap – the inability 
of small firms to access the finance they need 
to grow – has been a long-term challenge for 
UK governments. Successive administrations 
have acknowledged the importance of the 
venture capital industry and implemented 
various initiatives in support of early-stage 
venture capital investment, including seed and 
start-up funding. But six decades after the first 
government intervention in support of finance 
to SMEs, there is still no consensus as to what 
constitutes an effective model of government 
intervention. 
Around the time of the Second World War, 
government thinking focused on plans to 
institutionalise business finance, by creating 
new organisations to provide funding to small 
and medium enterprises (the Industrial and 
Commercial Finance Corporation, ICFC, which 
later evolved into 3i). Tax incentive schemes 
to promote investments and the availability 
of external finance to business were originally 
introduced in 1983 and were replaced in the 
1990s by the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
and Venture Capital Trusts. Towards the end of 
the 1990s, a number of new initiatives were 
introduced, targeting different sub-segments 
of the early-stage market, namely the regional 
Venture Capital markets (Regional Venture 
Capital Funds), university spin-outs (University 
Challenge Funds) and very small businesses 
(Enterprise Guarantee Funds). 
The introduction of Enterprise Capital 
Funds (ECFs) in the new century saw the 
Government’s focus shift to incentivising 
private investors to co-invest with publicly 
backed venture funds, in the case of ECF by 
providing 2:1 matching of private capital. The 
effect of this and other policies has been to 
shift public sector investment from stand-alone 
public sector funds to co-investment with 
private investors.33 This includes both ad hoc 
co-investing by free-standing public sector 
funds with private investors as well as co-
investment funds which are required to invest 
alongside private investors.
The public sector has become considerably 
more important as an investor in both absolute 
and relative terms. Investments involving public 
sector funds, both as sole investors and with 
private investors (funds and individuals), have 
risen from 18 per cent of all venture capital 
investments in 2001 to 43 per cent in 2007. In 
short, private sector funding has become less 
significant, although still important, and public 
sector venture capital funds are becoming 
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more important but changing their approach 
from investing on a free standing basis to 
co-investing with business angels and private 
sector funds.34
The credit crunch has made government action 
even more relevant to the financing of early-
stage businesses. As we shall see below, it 
has made private capital for venture finance a 
scarce and dwindling phenomenon.
4.2 The impact of the global financial 
crisis on UK growth finance
Many small businesses face financial challenges 
in the recession, as banks (the main source of 
credit for most smaller firms) become more 
risk-averse. In early 2009, some 30 per cent of 
small firms faced liquidity problems,35 and the 
CBI36 predicts that the availability of finance 
will worsen for UK businesses: 28 per cent of 
firms that took part in their survey expect that 
existing finance availability will tighten further 
while 60 per cent expect availability of new and 
renewed credit to decline.
But the effect on high-growth firms and the 
equity capital on which they depend has been 
even more damaging. NESTA’s research has 
shown that existing venture funds have very 
little money remaining to invest, and that the 
rate at which new venture funds are raised has 
slowed dramatically.37 All of this raises severe 
challenges for the cohort of 1,000 high-
potential firms, most of which will require new 
finance in the next 12-18 months.
We will look first of all at the causes of this 
funding collapse, and then at its effects.
The parlous state of finance for early-stage 
firms in the UK is a function both of the direct 
effects of the credit crunch and of longer-
term trends. As we shall see, venture capital 
investment in the UK has paradoxically been 
hit both by the prolonged availability of cheap 
debt before the crunch, and by its sudden 
evaporation.
The effect of the credit crunch and the 
accompanying downturn is the most obvious 
cause. Falling stock markets and poorer trading 
environments make it harder for funds to 
sell or float their existing investments, which 
then require further investment to keep them 
running, severely limiting the amount available 
for new investments. In addition, some funds’ 
limited partners (financial investors) are 
suffering in the current liquidity crisis; there is 
anecdotal evidence that this too is affecting 
their ability to fund further investments.38 
Finally, some observers have also noticed a 
trend for institutional investors (who provide 
the money for some venture capital funds) to 
reduce the amount of money going into private 
equity of all kinds, which makes it harder 
to raise venture capital funds (even though 
the bulk of the asset class is dominated by 
leveraged buy-outs, a very different type of 
investment).
The effect of the credit crunch on other 
sources of venture funding, such as angel 
investors, has not been studied in depth, but it 
seems likely that the poor performance of most 
asset classes in recent years will leave these 
rich investors with less money to invest in high-
growth firms.
The recent falling off of venture capital 
funding is particularly damaging because it 
comes on the back of a long-running period of 
disinvestment in UK early-stage finance on the 
part of many funders.
Although equity investments in unquoted 
companies trebled between 2003 and 2007 
from £4 billion to nearly £12 billion, this 
expansion in investment activity has been in 
‘private equity’ rather than ‘venture capital’, 
propelled by a huge increase in funding 
for leveraged buy-outs. Large, leveraged 
investments are financially attractive to funds, 
particularly if they generate fees based on their 
total assets under management: a £1 billion 
fund doing leveraged buy-outs will generate 
more income than a £75 million fund backing a 
similar number of early-stage businesses. 
This has had the effect of driving up the 
average (mean) size of investment to £9 
million in 2007, more than twice its 2001 
value.39 This trend has gone even further in 
the credit crunch, with entrepreneurs reporting 
venture funds taking equity stakes in revenue-
generating technology firms in return for 
working capital – effectively filling the role 
normally played by banks rather than the 
traditional role of early-stage investors.
Early-stage investments have fallen since 
2000 as a proportion of total private equity 
investment (apart from in 2006) and their share 
of total investment activity has been less than 
5 per cent in recent years (Figure 5). 
The variability of returns on venture 
investments has also limited levels of 
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investment. Much of this has been caused by 
the very poor returns on investments made 
during the 1998-2001 technology bubble: 
given the long-term nature of venture capital 
funds, the effects of these deals continued to 
be felt through the 2005. Although there is 
some evidence that performance is beginning 
to improve, it will take longer for fund returns 
to rise significantly, since the first funds raised 
after the bubble (the 2002-03 vintage) are 
only just beginning to show returns, and 
even these may be too early to infer overall 
performance.40
The consequence of all of this is a dramatic 
shortfall in the funds available for venture 
capital investment. As Figure 6 shows, 2008 
saw a sharp drop in the amount of money 
raised for venture capital investment. 
At the same time, existing funds are largely 
tapped out. Thirty-nine funds have been 
actively investing in the early-stage space over 
the last five years. NESTA research suggests 
that there are only 13 that have over £5 million 
each left to invest and the total remaining 
cumulative funds available for investment are 
in the region of £400 million.41 In many cases, 
these funds are being reserved for unplanned 
follow-on investment in portfolio companies, 
and are unavailable to fund new growth.
These and other factors affecting the wider 
investment market have led us to conclude that 
funding for early-stage technology companies 
is already extremely low. The trend is likely to 
become more evident in 2009 as fewer funds 
are closing and significantly less money is 
available to firms. This underlines the need for 
emergency support to ensure that some of the 
UK’s most promising technology can survive 
and thrive.
Figure 5: Early-stage investments as a percentage of total investments, 1984-2008
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Part 5: Cautionary tales: the risks of public venture 
capital investment 
Although there is a clear shortage of finance 
for high-growth companies in the coming 
years, and a gap that public support could fill, 
the Government should proceed with caution. 
Governments’ attempts to stimulate the early-
stage finance market have a chequered history. 
It is important to take on board the lessons of 
past policies when considering how the state 
can create a supportive environment for growth 
companies.
Many past interventions have fallen foul of a 
few common problems: trying to achieve too 
many goals; being sub-scale; limiting the pool 
of potential investments; being too generous 
with public money; and having unrealistic 
time horizons. Avoiding these pitfalls is a 
prerequisite for any credible policy in this area.
The tyranny of multiple objectives
Many publicly backed funds (e.g. Regional 
Venture Capital Funds and University Challenge 
Funds) have multiple objectives: they may 
seek to deliver both a commercial and a social 
return, or to encourage regional development.43 
NESTA’s experience of running and investing in 
funds suggests that it is very difficult to make 
successful investment while also pursuing other 
objectives. Indeed, the more objectives a fund 
has (either explicitly or tacitly), the less likely it 
is to satisfy any of them. Explicit non-financial 
objectives also make it harder to recruit an 
appropriate team: at present, investment 
professionals with the skills to undertake 
economic development work are rarely those 
with the best track records of backing and 
developing profitable companies.44
Size matters45 
Public funds also frequently suffer from 
problems of size. Firstly, they can be too small 
to operate effectively, either not being able 
to invest enough to justi fy their operating 
costs, or not spending enough on staff 
and operations to make good investments. 
Secondly, small funds are particularly likely to 
make small investments, which can often be 
self defeating, as investees spend too much 
time looking for their next funding round and 
not enough time building their business. The 
‘drip-feed’ model of finance, which is often 
justified as allowing investors to keep a close 
eye on company performance, often has the 
opposite effect, focusing management teams 
on financial issues that have nothing to do with 
the operations of the firm.
In a typical venture capital fund, the general 
partners receive an annual management fee 
of up to 2 per cent of the committed capital, 
which is applied to the firm’s operations. 
Therefore, a venture capital fund should have 
a minimum £30 million under management 
which will provide a £600,000 operating annual 
budget. This could sustain the fund’s entire 
operations, including salaries, overheads, 
marketing, investor management and meeting 
regulatory requirements. 
But a £5 million fund (such as the University 
Challenge Funds) would not have this ballast. 
At this level annual income would be just 
£100,000, barely sufficient to cover basic 
administrative costs, let alone recruit the talent 
necessary for success.
Geographical limitations constrain returns
A number of publicly backed funds are 
geographically focused, with a requirement to 
concentrate on certain English regions or UK 
nations. Although venture capital certainly 
has a role to play in stimulating regional 
economies, limiting funds to regions has 
significant risks. Firstly, it is often associated 
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with being sub-scale and having mixed 
investment objectives, as outlined above. 
Secondly, it constrains funds’ ability to source 
high-quality investments: economic activity 
frequently crosses the borders between 
regions, which in the UK are relatively small 
in geographic terms. This means that a fund 
that can only invest in its local region is likely 
to turn down many potentially attractive but 
non-local investments it encounters, reducing 
its chances of striking good deals.
Geographically bounded funds are also a 
factor in a wider and potentially troubling 
phenomenon: the predominance of public 
funding in particular UK regions. Figure 7 
below shows that the overwhelming majority 
of early-stage venture capital investments 
in many UK regions and nations are publicly 
backed. This in itself is not necessarily 
a cause for concern: if the alternative is 
sensible investments not being made, public 
intervention may be justified. But combined 
with the other concerns about public funds 
(in particular, the vitiating effect of mixed 
objectives and small fund size on investment 
quality), this becomes more problematic.
Over-generous public support weakens 
incentives
Cash-strapped entrepreneurs unsurprisingly 
welcome public investment when private 
investment is scarce. But it is possible to 
invest too much public money into a fund. The 
Canadian Labour Fund programmes made a 
disproportionately large contribution through 
tax credits into public-private funds. This over-
generous contribution allowed private investors 
to borrow the contribution that was required of 
them, and use the fund’s management fee to 
offset part or all of the cost of borrowing. Thus 
they were ahead even before the fund began 
to make returns, which severely weakened their 
incentives to make smart investments, and 
defeated the object of involving the private 
sector in the first place. There is a strong case 
for requiring a significant private investment 
into funds to ensure incentives are well aligned.
Many early-stage funds grossly 
underestimate how long it takes to exit an 
investment47
Public investors should be aware that venture 
investing is a long-term proposal, unlikely 
to deliver returns to politically convenient 
Figure 7: Publicly backed early-stage investments as a proportion of all early-stage 
investments in the UK regions, 2000-2008
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timetables. The average time required for a 
venture-backed company to exit has more 
than doubled in the last ten years, from 4.2 
years in 1999 to 9.6 years in 2008. Even highly 
successful technology-based companies can 
take seven to eight years from seed-stage to 
exit. It is not uncommon for life sciences start-
ups to conduct five to seven years of trials; the 
company may not generate revenue until years 
after the initial investment, let alone provide 
a return when the investor wishes to sell his 
stake.
With meaningful realisations for a fund unlikely 
to occur until its sunset years, any early-stage 
funds that expect to achieve exits (and initial 
returns) within a few years are destined for 
failure. This can pose a challenge for publicly-
backed funds, which can be subject to the 
shorter time horizons and resource constraints 
demanded by politics and external events. 
With performance management common 
in public policy, publicly-backed funds are 
often required to measure and report their 
performance within years of their launch. Doing 
so is both inappropriate and counterproductive: 
a fund may be perceived to be a ‘failure’ if it 
has not achieved any exits or return after a 
few years of investing. At best, this will be a 
distraction; at worst, it may compromise the 
fund’s ability to make its existing investments 
pay off.
The shortcomings of many publicly backed 
schemes to stimulate early-stage investment 
offer valuable lessons for the future. We cannot 
afford to waste our limited resources and ignore 
the hard-earned lessons of previous funds and 
policies. Just as important is identifying what 
does work. This is the focus of the next section.
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Part 6: Effective public investment in venture capital
6.1 What works? A framework for what 
the government should do
In the previous sections, we identified the 
case for public intervention to help fill the 
gap in finance for growth companies. We also 
examined some key failings of past policies 
intended to encourage early-stage investment. 
So, what should the Government actually do? 
How can the Government create the conditions 
for investment in high-potential entrepreneurial 
firms?
Public investments are essential to fill the 
capital gap48 and may serve a ‘bridging’ 
function to facilitate external private 
investments in early-stage business.49 Through 
its programmes, the Government ought to 
complement rather than compete with the 
private sector.50 Its role should be to create the 
necessary conditions to attract private investors 
through incentives, lower risks and guaranteed 
rewards. 
This chapter begins by setting out three 
principles for intervention, continues by 
illustrating the various choices that a 
government has to make when choosing 
what to do, and concludes by illustrating the 
proposed design and structure of investment.
Principles for intervention
Given the challenge facing high-growth 
businesses in the UK, the constraints that the 
recession is putting on public budgets, and 
the difficulties of previous public investment 
programmes that sought to pick winners, there 
are three principles that should guide public 
support for early-stage investment:
1. Timeliness
Programmes that take several months – or 
years – to deliver investment to businesses will 
not meet the needs of today’s growth firms. In 
the words of James Foster, Chief Executive of 
XMOS, one of the UK’s leading semiconductor 
start-ups: “The recession has severely cut 
venture funding for innovation, and new ideas 
are not getting funded. This industry will 
be dead in a year’s time unless something is 
done”51 about investment. This means that the 
set-up time of any proposed intervention is 
vitally important.
2. Discernment
Early-stage investment depends on the ability 
to identify good investments and manage 
them well. The role of government is not to 
make smart investments, but to make sure 
smart investments get made. Any intervention 
relying on public money must ensure that it 
finds its way to companies most likely to grow 
and prosper regardless of how the investment 
is allocated.
3. Efficiency
Given the increasing pressures on government 
spending, any proposed solution must make 
the best possible use of government money. 
Each pound of public money should leverage 
as much private money as possible. Any 
intervention should be as time-limited as 
possible, encouraging private investment to 
take its place.
The choices facing the Government
Government faces a number of choices in 
supporting early-stage investment. Any scheme 
that aims to help fill the finance gap and 
encourage a functioning market to emerge 
must address the following questions:
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•	How much money is needed?
•	What form should the money take?
•	Should government investment be direct or 
indirect?
•	Should indirect investment be in existing or 
new funds?
•	How should private capital be leveraged?
We address these questions in turn, 
highlighting the main issues and providing 
recommendations, along with case studies of 
attempts to stimulate the venture market in 
Israel, New Zealand and Canada that cast light 
on the issues.
How much money is needed?
As described earlier, between 2007 and 2008 
the amount invested in venture capital funds 
fell by over £450 million. 
In 2008, 190 companies received at least52 
£354 million in venture capital funding round 
1 investment with a median investment of 
£850,000. In addition, 234 companies received 
at least53 £641 million in further funding 
(funding rounds 2, 3 etc.). In this case, the 
median investment is £1.7 million.
In general, between a quarter and a third of 
all venture capital amounts are invested in 
new companies each year (Table 1) and the 
remainder goes in follow-on investments. 
In section 4.2, we saw that the total remaining 
cumulative funds available for investment are in 
the region of £400 million.54 We also illustrated 
that in 2008, only £179 million new money 
was raised. Consequently, the total ‘investable’ 
venture capital is in the region of £580 million. 
Based on previous practice evident in Table 
1 and on the assumption that all investable 
amounts currently available will be invested 
this year, we anticipate that between £150 
and £200 million of the £580 million would 
be invested in funding round 1 companies 
and the remaining £390-£440 million would 
go in follow-on investments. If 2008 levels of 
venture capital activity are to be sustained, an 
additional amount of £100 million needs to be 
dedicated to funding round 1 companies and 
an extra £200 million is required for follow-on 
investments. 
Recommendation: an injection of £300 million 
to £350 million (whether of public funds alone 
or public and private funds) would meet the 
challenges of early-stage firms.
What form should investment take?
Previous policies to promote venture 
investment have included both government 
investment and tax breaks. Both have a cash 
cost to the Government, but the two options 
have a different time profile. Money invested 
can, with the right channels, find its way 
quickly to businesses in need of investment. 
Tax incentives will generally take longer to 
affect the system, not least because they rely 
on influencing the behaviour of investors. And 
if the tax benefit does not accrue immediately, 
the incentive to act will be further delayed.
Recommendation: Government involvement 
should take the form of investment rather than 
tax credit, in order to meet the principle of 
timeliness. 
Direct or indirect investments? 
If Government intervention is to take the form 
of investment, should this be done directly or 
indirectly? Direct investment, along the lines of 
ICFC or other government-run funds, involves 
the government setting up a body that invests 
money with businesses; indirect investment 
relies on using an intermediary to invest the 
money.
The concept of direct venture capital 
investments to individual firms was first 
Table 1: Proportion of funding round 1 investment, 2003-2008
* In 2008, two funding round 1 investments were reported for £50 million each 
Source: Figures calculated using the Library House database which has now been acquired by Dow Jones, Venture Source
Proportion of Funding Round 1 investments  27% 26% 15% 24% 23% 36%
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
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introduced in the UK with the creation of ICFC, 
which later evolved into 3i. Venture capital was 
virtually non-existent in the UK in the mid-
1940s and the model of direct investments in 
companies was seen as a way of adding value 
creation to the companies and initiating a 
vibrant venture capital market in the UK. 
In general, the model of direct investments 
requires the creation of new organisational 
infrastructure. This can be appropriate if a 
country entirely lacks venture capital skills 
and expertise and sees no way of importing 
them as in post-war Britain, when the ICFC was 
established: the country lacked not just small 
business finances, but also the skills to invest it 
and the wherewithal to administer the process. 
The direct approach has its drawbacks.  It takes 
too long to set up such a large organisation. 
On average, an individual investment manager 
needs three months to complete a single 
investment. If a venture capital portfolio is to 
be executed properly, a lengthy due diligence 
process is required. Technology specialists 
need to be identified and consulted. Careful 
investigation of the market is needed within 
the framework of the pre-investment process. 
Therefore, it will take 50 to 100 investment 
managers to invest £100 million in a year 
(based on £250,000 – £500,000 per deal and 
three months for each deal). The creation of a 
fund with such a large number of investment 
managers takes a long time to establish. 
Secondly, there is the question of investment 
skill. A large public fund will face the dilemma 
of either hiring a large number of staff from 
private funds (which will be expensive, 
arguably defeating the purpose of establishing 
a public fund, and risking crowding out private 
investment) or deploying a large number of 
relatively inexperienced investment managers, 
which is likely to make for poor investments.55 
The alternative lies with delegating the 
decision-making though a public fund of 
funds, which could then invest in privately run 
funds, taking advantage of their expertise. 
This has been the approach of a number of 
successful programmes in other countries, 
including Yozma in Israel (see box), Finnish 
Industry Investors and The New Zealand 
Venture Investment Fund (see box).
Recommendation: Unlike in 1945, the UK 
today possesses a large number of venture 
funds and investment professionals. The case 
for creating a venture funder from scratch 
seems weak, particularly as setting it up could 
take years, limiting the likelihood of fast 
investments.
Instead, we propose putting public money into 
a fund of funds to invest in private venture 
funds, taking advantage of their expertise, 
and meeting the principles of timeliness and 
discernment.
Yozma is one of the most powerful examples 
of how investment can foster the innovation 
system. This public-private fund of funds 
was established in Israel in 1993 and then 
privatised in 1997. Yozma was a new part 
of the Israeli innovation system with the 
specific aim of stimulating venture capital. 
The government established a $100 million 
investment company and co-invested in 
new venture capital funds alongside private 
investors, typically providing 40 per cent of 
the fund’s capital. This led to the creation of 
ten drop-down funds. Each fund received 
$8 million investment from Yozma and $12 
million from strategic private investors. 
The fund also made a small number of direct 
investments to stimulate the market at this 
very early stage of its development. 
Predetermined exit conditions were 
introduced as an incentive for private co-
investment: Yozma’s partners had a five-year 
option to buy out the government’s share 
at predetermined conditions. Eight out of 
ten investors exercised their option and 
bought out the government.56 Yigal Erlich, 
the founder and now chairman of Yozma, 
argues57  that the private funds were more 
interested in the return they could make than 
the possibility of loss, hence the decision 
to provide upside incentives rather than 
downside protection.
Particular attention was given to funds from 
the US aimed at establishing links with the 
US venture capital community and Yozma 
actively encouraged the involvement of 
the US in its drop-down funds. As a result, 
Israel
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most of the early-stage investments in 
Israel will not be sold to Israeli companies 
but to US companies, or will trade on US 
stock exchanges and some 70 per cent of 
investment in Israeli venture funds at the end 
of the 1990s came from the US.58 
Thanks to a number of successful exits by 
Yozma funds in 1996-1998, the venture 
capital industry networks in Israel were 
extended, multinational companies entered 
the Israeli market and collective learning by 
the Israeli venture capital industry emerged.59 
By 2005, $10 billion was raised by venture 
capital funds and 60 venture capital funds 
were operating. 
According to Erlich, the government 
intervention was the turning point for the 
venture capital industry in Israel. A high-
tech development finance system with 
global and local links had been established. 
Private venture capital became abundant 
ending Yozma’s role as a pump-priming body. 
Yozma was deemed ready to join the market, 
its public animator function successfully 
fulfilled.60 As Cooke says, perhaps this is 
the apotheosis of the successful innovation 
support policy, whereby it achieves the 
demise of its own public-sector venture 
financing body.61 
The Israeli government intervention was 
relatively short – Yozma was privatised four 
years after its inception. Erlich believes 
that interventions such as Yozma need to 
be temporary and they should not replace 
the role of the private funds: “when there 
is a need, the government has to take 
action by intervening in the market but this 
intervention has to be temporary”.
Yozma’s example shows that carefully 
directed government interventions can prove 
very successful. However, Yozma’s success 
was not solely a result of its organisational 
structure or re-structure. It benefited from 
the creation and re-enforcement of suitable 
conditions for interactive learning between 
start-ups and the venture capital community, 
and the vital establishment of close links 
with American venture capital. Policymakers 
should further investigate the example of 
Yozma when considering suitable models for 
public intervention. 
Figure 8: Total amount raised by Israeli high-tech companies ($m)
Israeli VC Funds Other entities
1997
240
190
1998
340
260
1999
436
576
2000
1,270
1,822
2001
812
1173
2002
480
650
2003
421
589
2004
665
800
Source: IVC Research Center, cited in Early-Stage Investments The Israeli Perspective, Yigal Erlich 
26
62. The material of this analysis 
is drawn from the NZVIF 
website: http://www.nzvif.
co.nz
63. Lerner, J., Moore, D. and 
Shepherd, S. (2005) ‘A 
study of New Zealand’s 
venture capital market 
and implications for public 
policy.’ Report to the 
Ministry of Research Science 
and Technology. Wellington: 
LECG Ltd.
64. Ibid.
65. NZVIF (2008) ‘Funding 
boost for VC backed growth 
companies.’ Media Release, 
December 2008. Auckland: 
NZVIF.
66. Lerner, J., Moore, D. and 
Shepherd, S. (2005) ‘A 
study of New Zealand’s 
venture capital market 
and implications for public 
policy.’ Report to the 
Ministry of Research Science 
and Technology. Wellington: 
LECG Ltd.
The New Zealand Venture Investment Fund 
(NZVIF)62 is a venture fund that manages 
fund of fund investments as well as making 
direct investments. NZVIF was established 
by the New Zealand government in 2002 to 
create a vibrant venture capital market. Prior 
to its establishment there was no dedicated 
venture capital operating in the country. 
NZVIF currently has $200 million of funds 
under management and it is invested through 
a $160 million Venture Capital Fund of Funds 
and a $40 million Seed Co-investment Fund. 
NZVIF’s investments are made either through 
privately managed venture capital funds or 
alongside experienced angel investors who 
are investing into New Zealand-originated, 
high-growth potential companies. 
The NZVIF Venture Capital Fund of Funds 
only invests in funds which have been 
successful in raising matching capital from 
private investors. The amount that NZVIF 
invests is dependent on the overall fund size 
as well as its investment stage and focus. 
However, the maximum amount that NZVIF 
is able to invest in any venture capital fund 
is NZ$25 million (£9.7 million). It invests 
in the Funds on the same terms as private 
investors, except that other investors in each 
Fund are provided with an option that is 
exercisable up to the end of the fifth year of 
the Fund to buy out the NZVIF investment 
on the basis of capital plus interest only (i.e. 
other investors can access any upside above 
this amount) and the Fund must operate 
within the investing profile across seed/start-
up/early expansion as set out by NZVIF. It 
participates in investor governance decisions 
on the same terms as private investors, with 
the same voting rights. Investor governance 
arrangements reflect current market 
practice.63 
To date six such Funds have been 
established, with five Funds currently active. 
$232 million has been invested through 
the programme (NZVIF plus private sector 
money) in 48 high-growth innovative 
companies.
The NZVIF Seed Co-investment Fund is an 
early-stage direct investment fund investing 
in early-stage high-growth companies. 
Established in late 2005, the fund provides 
$40 million of matched investment alongside 
selected Seed Co-investment partners on 
a 1:1 basis into seed and start-up high-
growth companies. To date $21 million has 
been invested together with nine Seed Co-
investment Partners to 26 companies.64 
The latest commitment of the NZVIF fund of 
$20 million has been made to an Annex Fund 
to support existing venture capital-backed 
portfolio companies which are seeking 
growth capital. NZVIF chief executive 
Franceska Banga said the Annex Fund is 
designed to assist companies which have 
previously received investment from NZVIF-
backed venture capital funds and are looking 
for follow-on funding for their next stage 
of growth, such as establishing an export 
base offshore and developing international 
markets.
“A number of highly promising venture 
capital fund portfolio companies are at 
the stage of needing more capital to fund 
further growth. At the same time, four 
of the six venture capital funds which 
NZVIF has backed are close to fully 
invested. The Annex Fund will provide 
further capital which the fund managers 
can draw on to fund the next stage of 
growth for their companies. In the current 
investment climate, it is difficult for any 
company to raise capital. It is especially 
difficult for young g rowth companies. 
In the past they might have attracted 
funding from US investors at this stage 
of their growth, but in the current market 
that source of capital has dried up.”65 
Since the inception of the NZVIF, there 
has been a strong and steady increase in 
the amount invested in the equity market. 
However, this increase is most apparent at 
the expansion stage. The venture capital 
stage has not yet seen strong growth similar 
to that experienced by other small economies 
such as Israel and Singapore.
The NZVIF programme and the VIF Seed 
Funds have contributed positively to the 
development of a larger pool of individuals 
with the necessary skills and expertise in 
seed and start-up investment.66
The NZVIF example illustrates a very sound 
approach to government intervention in 
support of establishing and sustaining the 
venture capital market. It has delegated 
the decision-making to commercial funds, 
New Zealand
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Existing funds versus new funds
Assuming that public money will be invested in 
private funds, it needs to be decided whether 
these will be existing or new funds. New funds 
offer the possibility of leveraging more external 
capital; they are also likely to be able to absorb 
more government funding than existing funds 
that had not been planning to make large 
numbers of new investments. Existing funds 
offer the ability to invest money quickly, with 
no set-up period.
Recommendation: Both proposals have 
their merits (investing existing funds offers 
timeliness, investing in new funds offers 
more efficiency through greater leverage 
opportunities). Our proposal is to do both, 
reserving part of the fund for immediate 
investment, and the remainder for investment 
into new funds.
it requires private co-investments and it 
supports the establishment of a vibrant 
market structure. 
Despite NZVIF’s positive role in catalysing 
the venture capital sector67 and its sound 
principles, the New Zealand venture 
capital market is still at an early stage of 
development is not yet self-sustaining. 
This highlights the fact that venture capital 
markets take several years to evolve and 
should not be considered as one-off 
approaches. 
In 1983, the first Labour Sponsored Venture 
Capital Corporation (LSVCC, also known 
as Labour Fund) was created in Quebec. 
LSVCCs and PVCCs (Provincial Venture 
Capital Corporations) raise their capital from 
individuals – this is why they are also called 
‘retail funds’ – who receive significant tax 
credits as incentives to invest in small and 
medium-sized companies.68 
Labour unions were involved in the 
governance of labour funds through board of 
director representation. However they were 
not involved in the day-to-day management. 
They were created to allow workers access 
to investment in venture capital and to 
fund businesses that would add jobs to the 
economy. Most of their investments in the 
1980s were in the form of development 
capital in traditional sectors.69 
The Labour Funds had a number of 
problematic incentive issues. 
•	The incentives of the Labour Fund 
managers were not closely aligned to the 
incentives of their retail investors. 
•	The costs associated with the reporting 
requirements of being publicly listed 
securities were onerous. 
•	The high number of retail investors 
increased the cost of administration and 
the fixed period for holding could lead to 
mass exodus of retail investors at the end 
of the stipulated period once all of the tax 
incentives had been accrued.
•	They provided retail investors with 
front-end tax credits. These incentives 
led to retail investors having incentives 
to invest in these funds for tax benefits 
that could be accessed irrespective of 
the performance of the fund, and thus 
distorted efficient investment behaviour.70 
The Canadian early experience with 
government interventions provides an 
illustration of the counter-productive 
effects of poorly designed policies. The 
overwhelming effect of the Labour Funds 
was to dramatically increase the size of 
capital invested in venture capital funds in 
Canada. The tax incentives for the LSVCCs 
programme led to an influx of inexperienced 
new investors. The excess competition for 
potential investment-ready firms crowded 
out private sector investment.71 
The Canadian venture capital market has 
now recovered from the earlier problems 
associated with the Labour Funds. However, 
Canada
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its  problems are not limited to Labour 
Sponsor Funds and are more complex. These 
funds have been restructuring during the 
recent years, as the rest of the industry, and 
the industry people are thinking more in 
terms of complementarily than ‘crowding 
out’ the private investors.
Canada wishes to evolve from a resource-
based economy to a knowledge-based 
economy. To achieve this, it has massively 
invested in publicly funded R&D. By 
means of a series of policy actions 
such as tax credits and government 
venture capital funds, both federal and 
provincial governments have supported 
the development of the venture capital 
industry.72
Recently, many funds of funds have been 
set up in various provinces, such as British 
Columbia and Alberta, which both have a 
fund of funds established with $90 million 
and $100 million respectively. The funds have 
specific attributes, minimum size and focus 
on technology. They also have to establish 
links with the best US funds. In June 2008, 
the Ontario government announced a 
new $205 million Ontario Venture Capital 
Fund. The fund is comprised of $90 million 
government investments and a $115 million 
infusion by institutional players. Later this 
year, a $250 million co-investment fund 
was created by the Ontario government 
to support companies operating in clean 
technology, life science, digital media and 
ICT. In Quebec, a new $700 million fund 
was created with a matching $250 million 
contribution from the Caisse de depot et 
placement du Quebec and the Solidarity 
Fund QFL and $200 million from the Quebec 
government. A further $100 million from 
other investors may be added to the fund.73 
Gilles Duruflé from North American Venture 
Capital Summit argues74 that ten years ago 
the Canadians were in favour of having 
geographical limitations: ”There was a fear 
that the best companies will be taken by the 
Americans. It is a strong belief that neither 
Canadians nor Europeans are willing to be 
the incubator for the Americans. Canadians 
have now changed the way they see things 
and believe that in order to build strong 
companies they need to be more open. There 
is still a fear that the best companies will 
move to the US, but you have to balance 
that with the fact that you also need to be 
open to get the right people on board.”
An exciting piece of information of the 
Canadian case is the fact that the funds 
that receive backing from the Business 
Development Bank of Canada (BDC) are 
allowed to invest 80 per cent in Canada, 
with 20 per cent able to be invested in other 
North American companies as a means of 
generating enhanced returns and fostering 
the transfer of best practices.
Table 2: Latest government responses to the VC market in Canada
Source: Gilles Duruflé 200975
BC Gov FoF $90m   $90m
AB Gov FoF $100m   $100m
ON Private FoF $90m  $115m $205m  $455m
 Co-inv fund $250m   $250m 
QC Private FoF $200m $500m $125m? $700m   $800m
 FoF $50m $50m $25m? $100m 
Fed. Invt in late $75m   $75m
 stage fund
Total  $855m $550m $115m $1,520m
  Government Other Private sector Total 
  allocation anchor LPs LPs (incented)
}
}
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How to leverage private capital: At the fund 
of funds level, the government has the option 
to either act alone or leverage its contribution 
with private capital. Clearly, leveraging private 
capital is better value for the Government. 
The challenge is to provide terms on which 
private capital will be willing to invest. The low 
returns in the venture capital market makes 
them unattractive for private investments as it 
entails high risks and small rewards. The risk is 
inherent and it will always remain in this area of 
the market but market professionals and high-
skilled venture capital investors can reduce it. 
The issue of small rewards to private investors 
is something that government can effectively 
deal with by providing the appropriate 
structure to diminish low returns. 
Recommendation: Our proposal is to 
encourage private co-investment into the 
fund of funds on a matching basis, with the 
public upside being subordinated to the 
private one by accepting a capped return. A 
more modest co-investment into new funds 
can then be accepted (perhaps on a 1:3 basis, 
since significant private money will already 
be invested from the fund of funds. This will 
ensure the fund of funds plays a catalytic role 
in encouraging private money into the market. 
The aim should be (as it was in Israel’s Yozma 
programme) to encourage the private sector 
eventually to buy out the public sector.
6.2 A proposal: the UK fund of funds
Early-stage venture capital is important 
because its activities have been shown to 
generate significant spill-over benefit to firms. 
However, the returns in the UK are low and not 
encouraging the creation of a venture capital 
industry as vibrant as that in the US. Therefore, 
the government needs to support this industry 
in several ways. 
•	First, by injecting money into existing 
funds that are in immediate need of cash to 
support their portfolio companies.
•	Second, by increasing the availability of 
money in the early-stage market by setting 
up public-private matching schemes. 
Building on lessons learned from successful 
models implemented elsewhere (such as 
Israel, New Zealand and Canada) and on some 
basic elements of the existing government 
interventions that have worked well, the 
interventions should complement rather than 
compete with private venture capital funds. 
The analysis in Section 5 shows that the new 
funds should be based on three principles: 
1. In order to avoid the tyranny of multiple 
objectives, the funds should only focus on 
financial returns.
2. The new funds should be large enough 
– at least £40 million – in order to operate 
effectively, be sustainable and make follow-
on investments.
3. The created funds should not have any 
geographical restrictions on where they can 
invest within the UK.
Based on the principle of public-private 
partnership, the aim of the proposed fund will 
be twofold: 
•	To provide much needed funding to existing 
venture capital funds that are struggling to 
raise additional money to follow-on their 
investments. 
•	To foster private venture capital investments 
in the early-stage market.
The fund of funds could provide a major 
boost to high-potential growth sectors. 
Separate funds could be created to provide 
vital early-stage equity funding to innovative 
firms, particularly in the areas identified by 
the government as promising ones: advanced 
engineering, electronics and biosciences.76
Main fund 
£150 million of government commitment 
should be used to leverage £150 million from 
private investment creating a fund of funds of 
£300 million. To assist fund managers to attract 
private sector investors, the government should 
subordinate its investment position in the fund 
of funds by putting a cap on its investment 
return, thereby boosting the anticipated return 
to private sector investors and agreeing to bear 
‘first losses’ (similar to existing regional venture 
capital funds).77
This structure will help reduce the high risks 
that early-stage investments contain. This is 
based on the same principle as the Enterprise 
Capital Funds model which requires approved 
funds to raise matching funding from the 
private sector. 
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The main fund would invest in two ways in 
funds operating in the early-stage technology 
venture capital space: existing funds and new 
funds. 
Existing funds
One third of the fund (£100 million) should 
be used to support existing venture capital-
backed companies that are in desperate need 
of investments in order to survive the turmoil. 
This capital will provide a significant injection 
to the market which only managed to raise 
less than £200 million last year compared with 
over £600 million the year before.78 There are 
currently hundreds of companies fundraising 
but due to the limited ‘investable’ money 
available in the market it is very likely that 
these ventures will collapse. 
Existing funds which are privately managed and 
have a track record of success should receive 
up to £20 million each from the fund of funds 
to invest in existing promising companies from 
their portfolio. The fund of funds will match 
the value of their existing portfolio (in order to 
avoid state aid). 
New funds
The remaining £200 million should be used to 
stimulate new ventures through the creation of 
six funds that will receive £30 million each. 
•	£100 million should be invested this year and 
the remainder over four years. 
•	In addition to the £30 million, each new 
fund will attract a further £10 million from 
private investors bringing the total capital of 
each fund to approximately £40 million and 
leveraging the government money by 40/60. 
•	By attracting further private investments, 
new funds will raise the total leverage of 
private money to £220 million (£150 million 
at the fund of funds level plus £70 million at 
the new funds level).
Due to their size, these funds will be able 
to make follow-on investments without the 
danger of dilution. 
The funds should be directly targeted at 
investing in early-stage companies that are 
falling into the ‘equity gap’. As such, it should 
make investments in companies seeking 
less than £500,000, with a target level for 
first investment of between £250,000 and 
£500,000. The funding limit on the amount 
that can be currently invested in a single 
company by public sector funds constrains 
follow-on investing in a co-investments 
situation. Very often, publicly backed fund 
portfolio companies cannot be followed up in 
the funding ladder and are abandoned before 
they are ready to attract private investment and 
as a result collapse. Therefore, the new funds 
should have the ability to make follow-on 
investments through to exit.
We believe this proposal offers an affordable, 
efficient, immediate way to provide finance to 
UK high-growth businesses. It should kick start 
our wider early-stage investment market. 
It is needed urgently. And there are huge 
potential rewards in growth, new jobs and new 
industries.
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Figure 9: Proposed structure of the fund of funds
£300 million public 
early-stage 
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